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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States was built on a tax revolt, the Boston Tea Party,'
and the early Republic was framed around such tax revolts as Shays'
Rebellion of 1786, the Whisky Rebellion of 1791, and Fries Rebellion of
1798-1799.' Indeed, the beginning of the Civil War was triggered by
agricultural tariffs.3 Tax limitations on local governments have a long
history, the oldest being an 1875 limit on the growth in property tax

rates in Missouri.4 Today tax revolts take the form of tax and
expenditure limitations ("TEL"). 5 The beginning of the recent tax
limitation movement is attributed to Howard Jarvis and the "People's
Initiative to Limit Property Taxation," or Proposition 13 in California.
This initiative was closely followed by Massachusetts' Proposition 2/2,
Michigan's Headlee Amendment, and others.7 Today, forty-six states
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have some form of constitutional or statutory state limitations on local
or state governments.8 The most restrictive TEL in the United States is
Colorado's Taxpayer's Bill of Rights ("TABOR"), which places severe
restrictions on how much state and local government spending can
increase.9
For the past few years, Wisconsin has seriously considered amending
the state's constitution along the lines of Colorado's TABOR.'0
Originally introduced in the spring of 2004 by Representative Frank
Lasee, Wisconsin's TABOR, or the Lasee-Wood Amendment, has
spurred significant debate throughout Wisconsin about the role of
government in general and the impact of taxing and spending on the
well-being of residents." What has motivated much of this discussion in
Wisconsin is the perception that Wisconsin is a "high" tax state.' 2 Such
conclusions are typically derived by comparing Wisconsin state and local
taxes to the other forty-nine states. Wisconsin's state and local taxes per
$1000 of personal income ranked as high as third in 1970 and as low as
thirteenth in 2000.1" The case is not so clear when the analysis is
broadened to include fees and to examine expenditure levels.'4 Such
comparisons do not include the quality of public services nor do they
address the varying costs of providing services as affected by outside
forces, such as climate, geographic distance, and population density.
It should be pointed out that there have been TELs at the local
government level in Wisconsin for about ten years. The local TELs
have recently been tightened with a focus on property tax, the dominant
source of revenues for Wisconsin local government."
These are
statutory limitations, and since they focus primarily on the property tax,
state government has not been affected. The current constitutional
amendment proposals would "lock-in" even tighter controls on local

8. Mullins & Wallin, supra note 1, at 3.
9. Bell Policy Center, Ten Years of TABOR: A Study of Colorado's Tax and Spending
Limit, ST. TAX NOTES, June 30, 2003, at 1119.
10. Andrew Reschovsky, The Taxpayer Bill of Rights: A Solution to Wisconsin's Fiscal
Problems or a Prescriptionfor Future Fiscal Crises?88 MARQ. L. REV. 135,135 (2004).
11. Id. at 135 n.1.
12. Id. at 137-38.
13. See id. at 141. Authors' calculations based on data from U.S. Census Bureau, State
and Local Government Finances, http://www.census.gov/govs/ www/estimate.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2007).
14. Reschovsky, supra note 10, at 139.
15. Id. at 138.
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government revenues or expenditures, but more importantly, they
would impose the same limits on state government. 6
The political and public debates that have swirled around the
TABOR and Wisconsin Taxpayer Protection Amendment ("WTPA")
proposals have two central tenets: (1) tax burdens are beyond the ability
to pay for the majority of Wisconsin residents, and (2) the burden has
hindered the ability of the state to grow and prosper economically."
Information concerning the question of tax burdens can show how
Wisconsin compares with other states. 8 But whether tax burdens are
excessive depends on the political preferences of citizens: are they
willing to pay for the public services they receive? The link between
taxes, spending and economic growth, and development is an argument
that can be quantifiable. As we discuss below, the academic literature
examining this link is well established. 9 While business surveys
consistently rank taxes as important, in practice taxes are secondary to
the larger costs of labor, land, and capital.2' In addition, these same
business surveys point out that quality schools, access to quality public
infrastructure, and protective services such as police and fire protection
are equally important. 2' TEL proposals, such as a freeze on property
taxes, could restrict our ability to invest in the physical and human
infrastructure that is a fundamental underpinning of our economy.
Current research suggests that only when businesses and residents are
not receiving the quantity and quality services for which they are paying
is something "broken" with the public sector. The research also shows
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GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1998); ROBERT G.
LYNCH, RETHINKING GROWTH STRATEGIES: How STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND
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that it is often difficult for citizens and businesses to accurately evaluate
the services they receive.
If the public sector is indeed "broken," TELs have been advanced as
a solution. 22 As described in more detail below, TELs take several
forms from targeted legislation to strict constitutional amendments.'
The argument advanced in Wisconsin for a constitutional approach is
that public officials lack the fiscal discipline to adhere to statutory
limitations, particularly at the state level. 24 Statutory limits can be more
easily modified than constitutional limits.2'
The question is whether or not TELs, in whatever format, achieve
the goals advanced by their advocates. While there is a vast and welldeveloped amount of academic literature examining the impact of TELs
on the structure of governments and spending levels, 26 we are aware of
only two studies that examine the impact of TELs on economic growth
and development. 27 Our intent with this study is to focus attention on
the impact TELs have on economic growth and development. We use
annual state level data for the fifty states from 1987 to 2003.
Beyond these brief introductory comments, the paper is composed
of six additional Parts. In Part II, we outline the range of TELs that are
in place across the United States and review in more detail the TELs
enacted in a handful of specific states. We then provide an overview of
the literature on the impacts of TELs on state and local government in
Part III. In Part IV of the paper we provide a descriptive analysis of
Wisconsin's fiscal rankings along with a simple analysis of public sector
employment. A simple analysis relating a set of fiscal measures on
overall level of economic well-being is then reported. Our analytical
growth model and results are then outlined and discussed in Part V, and
the paper closes with a summary of our findings and a broad discussion
of TELs, with a focus on Wisconsin.

22. See generally BARRY POULSON, AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUND., A FISCAL
DISCIPLINE REPORT CARD: GRADING THE STATES' TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS (2005),
available at http://www.americansforprosperity.org/includes/filemanager/files/pdf/afp-telrank
_0705.pdf.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Reschovsky, supra note 10, at 137.
25. POULSON, supra note 22, at 2.
26. See, e.g., Mullins & Wallin, supra note 1, at 2-15.
27. James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, The Effect of Property-Tax Limits on Wages
and Employment in the Local Public Sector, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1995); McGuire &
Rueben, supra note 7, at 459.
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II. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT TELs
As noted in the introductory comments above, forty-six of the fifty
states have some form of TEL in place on state or local governments,
with the oldest being an 1875 limit on the growth in property tax rates in
Missouri. 8 But as noted by Poterba and Rueben, no two states are
completely alike. TELs range from limits on how fast specific taxes can
increase for specific units of government to strict limits on how much
government spending can increase from one year to the next.2 9 Joyce
and Mullins provide a general classification scheme for TELs that is
provided in Table 1' Summaries of TELs aimed at local governments
are outlined in Table 2, 3' while TELs targeting state government are
provided in Table 3.2
One important element of individual TELs that is not addressed in
Joyce and Mullins' classifications is whether the limits are statutory or
constitutional in nature. As discussed in detail by Fino,33 the distinction
between statutory and constitutional limits is significant. Statutory
limits can be more easily modified or rescinded than constitutional limits
in times of fiscal or economic emergencies.' 4 Fino does note, however,
that unlike the U.S. Constitution, which is seldom modified, state
constitutions are more readily modified, often to reflect the short-term
political winds.35 As of the fall of 2006, there were five proposed
changes to the Wisconsin Constitution ranging from limiting the terms
of certain county officers to four-year terms, to requiring photo
identification to register to vote and to vote, to defining the definition of
marriage to be limited to one man and one woman (the gay marriage

28. Mullins & Wallin, supranote 1, at 3.
29. See James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, Pub. Pol. Inst. of Cal., Fiscal Rules and
State Borrowing Costs: Evidence from California and Other States 5, 9 (1999), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R-1299JPR.pdf.
30. The information in Table 1 infra is taken from Philip G. Joyce & Daniel R. Mullins,
The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector: The Impact of Tax and
ExpenditureLimitations, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 240,241 (1991).

31. The information in Table 2 infra is taken from Mullins & Wallin, supra note 1, at 67.
32. The information in Table 3 infra is taken from National Conference of State
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.orglprograms/fiscal/telsabout.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
33. Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse than the Disease? Taxation and Finance Provisions in
State Constitutions,34 RUTGERS L. J. 959,959-60 (2003).

34. See id. at 959.
35. Id. at 960-61.
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36
ban amendment), to redefining the governor's line-item veto authority.
Even though state constitutions are often modified, constitutional
provisions tend to be difficult to remove no matter how dated the
amendment or how forgotten the predicament that initiated the
provision's original adoption. 7
Because of the unpopularity of the property tax, most local TELs
focus on the property tax.38 Typical local TELs limit the rate of growth
in the property tax rate (mill rate), growth in property assessments, or
some combination of the two. The combination is often called a
property tax levy limit where the rate of growth in total property tax
revenues is limited. Generally, increases are tied to the inflation rate or
a set annual rate (e.g., 2%). When the TEL applies just to property tax,
local governments can often sidestep the limits by diversifying revenue
streams through imposing user fees or charges or expanding the sales
tax if one is in place. 39 The rapid acceleration in the use of these
alternative sources of revenue in many states can be explained in part by
the limitations imposed on property taxes. 4° As other states move away
from the property tax to these alternatives and Wisconsin retains its
reliance on the property tax, Wisconsin's property tax burden appears
relatively high. Because the property tax is predominately used by local
governments and in particular public school districts, these types of
TELs tend to disproportionately impact local governments. School
districts in particular tend to have only property taxes and state
revenues for funding.
To gain a better insight into the nature of TELs, we provide an
overview of several TELs enacted in the last thirty years to highlight
They are Michigan's Headlee
their similarities and differences.
Amendment, California's Proposition 13, Massachusetts' Proposition

36. For the Wisconsin Constitution to be amended, the proposal must pass both the state
assembly and senate in two back-to-back legislative sessions and then is passed to the voters
for approval. Simple majority voting rules apply. The governor's office plays no formal role
other than a bully pulpit to lobby for or against the provision. The Wisconsin TABOR and
WPTA provisions have passed the assembly but have not been approved by the senate. See
Revisor of Statutes Bureau, Wis. State Legislature, http://www.legis.state.wi.us/rsb/2
wiscon.html.
37. Fino, supra note 33, at 959 (quoting Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman,
Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effect of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991
Wis. L. REV. 1301,1304).
38. Daniel R. Mullins, Tax and ExpenditureLimitations and the FiscalResponse of Local
Government: Asymmetric Intra-Local FiscalEffects, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Winter 2004,
at 111, 112.
39. Id. at 113.
40. Id. at 112-13.
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2 , and Colorado's TABOR. While each of these has a popular name,
in general, the TELs in each state are a series of laws and amendments,
often related and sometimes complicating each other.
A. Michigan
Michigan's Headlee amendment was passed in 1978."
The
amendment
is
actually
a
package
of
changes
to
article
IX
of
the
state
• • 42
constitution. The major provisions include: (1) an overall limit on state
revenue collections (a function of state revenues in 1978-1979 and total
personal income in 1977); (2) a similar limit on spending; (3) a fixed
share of the state budget for local governments; (4) a property tax rate
rollback if growth in revenues on a community-wide basis exceeds the
rate of inflation; and (5) state funding of new local government
mandates. 3 This later provision has resulted in continuing litigation
over funding of special education programs.'
Proposal A, passed in 1994, further limits property taxes by capping
the increase in assessments on each individual parcel to the rate of
inflation." This is similar to Proposition 13 in California. Proposal A
also requires a three-fourths vote of the legislature to increase the
property tax levies used by local school districts." This provision moves
control from the local to the state level. While local taxes decreased,
state taxes increased as a result of Proposal A. 7
At the state level in Michigan, there are continuing accounting
questions on how revenues are classified and which are subject to the
state revenue limit.4' The supreme court has had to define almost every
aspect of the amendment. Revenues that are less than 1% over the limit
may be transferred to the rainy day fund. 9 If excess revenues are more
than one percentage point over the limit, they must be returned to
payers of the state income tax or the single business tax."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Fino, supra note 33, at 987.
Fino, supra note 7, at 681.
See id. at 681, 685, 690.
Id. at 691-93.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 688.
Fino, supra note 33, at 988-90.
Id. at 992.
Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:497

B. California
Proposition 13 was passed by California voters in 1978.51 Proposition
13 was preceded by several property tax limitations, and school tax
revenues had already been capped in 1972.52 The Proposition limits the
property tax rate to 1% and limits increases in assessments to 2% or the
rate of inflation, whichever is less, unless the property has been
improved. 3 When property changes hands, the assessment may be
brought up to market value.- At the time of implementation, assessed
values were rolled back two years.55 Voter override is not allowed for
operating purposes.16 The measure also extends to some other local
revenues
and requires a two-thirds majority vote for new "special
57
taxes.

In addition, Proposition 13 gave the state government complete
control over property tax rates and the authority to allocate local
property tax revenues in order to equalize school funding.58 It thus
eroded local control according to many observers. 9 Local budgeting
became a process little understood by either citizens or local officials. 6
Local governments began competing for the local sales tax base and
local governments subsequently turned to greater reliance on local sales
taxes and user fees.6 In 1996 voters passed Proposition 218, which
limits local governments' use of service charges and assessments.62
C. Massachusetts
Proposition 21 was passed by referendum in Massachusetts in
1980.63 Local property taxes were capped at 2.5% of real property

51. Alvin D. Sokolow, The Changing Property Tax in the West: State Centralization of
Local Finances,PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 2000, at 85, 92.
52. Kirk J. Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really
Cause Proposition13?, ST. TAX NOTES, Nov. 24, 2003, at 701-26.
53. Carol Douglas, Proposition 13-25 Years Later, ST. TAX NOTES, Oct. 20, 2003, at
222.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Sokolow, supra note 51, at 98.
61. Douglas, supra note 53, at 224.
62. Sokolow, supra note 51, at 96.
63. Wallin, supra note 7, at 35.
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value, 6' a tax break of $550 million-$347 million in property taxes and
$200 million in car excise taxes.65 Cities and towns above the limit were
given three years to cut their rates.'
Nominal annual growth in
property tax revenues is limited to 2.5%, unless a vote of the residents
allows a greater increase.67
Proposition 21 has been amended several times. 68 In 1981, the
legislature allowed property taxes on new construction to be added to
the allowed annual 2.5% increase in assessments.69 Originally, a twothirds majority vote was required to increase the 2.5% limit. This was
reduced to a majority vote.7" To clarify, citizens may vote to allow the
assessments to increase by more than 2.5%, but property taxes cannot
exceed 2.5% of market value.71 In 1986, a cap on state revenues was
approved.
Growth in revenues was capped at the rate of growth in
wages and salaries. 73 Excess revenues, up to 5% of state revenues, are
directed to a rainy day fund, and additional revenues are returned to
taxpayers.74
To make up for the anticipated (and actual) loss in revenues, many
localities that had resisted assessing at full market value reassessed.75
Municipalities also increased their reliance on fees.76 At the same time,
public school enrollments dropped, somewhat easing the constraints on
schools.77 While the state originally increased aid to local governments,
when Massachusetts went into recession in the early 1990s, state aid was
cut 30% in two years. 8 During the recovery, state aid rose but fell again
in the recession of 2002. 79 When investigating the impacts of

64. Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 41.

66. Id. at 39.
67. Katherine L. Bradbury et al., Property Tax Limits, Local Fiscal Behavior and
Property Values: Evidence from Massachusetts under Proposition 21h, 80 J. PUB. ECON. 287,

288 (2001).
68. Wallin, supra note 7, at 42.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 42-43.
71. Id. at 43.
72. Id. at 45.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 41.
76. Id. at 42.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Proposition 21h, Bradbury, Mayer, and Case found that "house prices
performed worse in communities that had slower increases in spending,
suggesting that Proposition 21/ led communities to spend 'too little' on
services." 80
D. Colorado

Colorado has a history of increasing restrictions on public budgets.
"[In] 1977, growth in Colorado's general fund spending was limited to 7
percent over the prior year's spending.",8' Excess revenue was allocated
first to a reserve fund and then to property tax relief.' This "spending
limit was amended in 1991 (the Arveschoug-Bird provision) to limit
annual appropriations to the lesser of five percent of Colorado personal
83
income or 6 percent over the prior year's general fund appropriations."
The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights passed in 1992 imposed additional
constraints: (1) any new tax or tax rate increase must be approved by
voters; (2) revenue collections are tied to the collections of the previous
year plus the growth in population and the inflation rate (local
governments can include new construction); (3) spending is limited to a
percentage growth (based on the Arveschoug-Bird provision above);
and (4) taxation options, such as new tax structures like local income tax
and state property tax, among others, are also limited. 8
Excess revenues of up to 3% of the general fund are allowed for
reserves. Their use, however, must be repaid in the following fiscal year.
This provision effectively means that the reserves are less of a rainy day
fund and more of a cash-flow reserve. 8 The rapid repayment provision
makes the use of a reserve fund difficult during a recession because
there is no assurance that recovery would be sufficient to repay the fund
in the next fiscal year. The mandated refund of surpluses went
predominantly to the highest income taxpayers;86 the maximum refund
allowed for low-income individuals and families was $388 due to the
structure of the earned income tax credit from federal income tax law.g7
Taxpayers reporting annual income less than $26,000 received an
80. Bradbury supra note 67, at 289.
81. McGuire & Rueben, supra note 7, at 460-61.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 460.
84. Bell Policy Center, supra note 9, at 1123-24.
85. National Conference of State Legislatures, Talking points
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/taborpts.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
86. Bell Policy Center, supra note 9, at 1136.
87. Id. at 1123.
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average refund of $252, while the average refund for those reporting
annual income of more than $126,000 was $1630.'
In 2000, voters passed Amendment 23, which
earmark[ed] revenue equal to one-third of 1 percent of
Colorado taxable income for a State Education Fund....
In general, the interaction between Amendment 23 and
TABOR [resulted] in more required spending on
education and less revenue for other categories of
spending.89
As a result of severe state budget constraints imposed by TABOR,
in November 2005, voters approved Referendum C.' Referendum C
suspends the TABOR revenue limit for five years (excess revenues do
not need to be returned to taxpayers), 9 and changes the growth factor
to apply to the prior year's limit on revenue growth rather than actual
revenue collected in the prior year. 92
McGuire and Rueben address the economic impacts of TABOR on
the Colorado economy. Although there is some limited evidence that
TABOR had a positive effect on employment growth in the five years
immediately following passage of the law, that "short-run effect was not
sustained into the second half of the decade. Indeed, Colorado's
employment growth between 1998 and 2003 was far below those of
comparable states."'93

III. REVIEW OF THE TEL LITERATURE
Proponents of TELs argue not only that government spending is too
high and needs to be lowered, but also that lower government spending
will increase economic growth. As noted above, the majority of the
empirical literature focuses on the fiscal implications of TELs-the
revenue and expenditure changes, if any. A much smaller number
examine changes in fiscal processes and institutions, if any, as a result of
TELs. Further, most of the empirical literature focuses on local
government TELs, in part because there is a longer history of TELs at

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
McGuire & Rueben, supra note 7, at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that level. The empirical literature on the economic effects of TELs is
very limited, as noted above.
A. Fiscal: Budget

Economic theory finds that the profit motive leads the private sector
to efficiently allocate resources, in other words, to produce the highest
value (as determined by consumers) output for the lowest value of
inputs. When resource allocation is efficient, the marginal costs of an
additional unit of output will be equal to the marginal benefits of that
unit to the consumer. Absent a profit motive in the public sector, there
are several hypotheses about how public budgets are determined and
whether they meet the test of efficiency in the allocation of resourcesdo the marginal costs of producing an additional unit of public service
equal the marginal benefits of that service to citizens?
Focusing on efficiency ignores that the public sector has objectives in
addition to efficiency. In fact, the public sector is in place, in part, to
provide the goods and services the private sector does not find
profitable to provide, but which consumers demand. The public sector
also has other objectives, such as equity, because the market does not
guarantee equity, but citizens also demand it. 9' Cameron's Law suggests
that the increasing openness of the economies of the world creates a
demand for budgetary stabilization of the erratic fluctuations of
markets, necessitating larger budgets. 95 This is another example of an
objective for the public sector which the market cannot provide.
At the same time, the value of the output of the public sector is
difficult to measure. Thus, citizens may not know if the public budgets
are well administered or not. Citizens are subject to fiscal illusion about
the costs and the benefits of public services.96 In attempting to discover

why TELs are supported by citizens, Lowrey and Sigelman found
evidence that citizens feel that taxes are too high for the level of
benefits, yet at the same time, citizens do not know what governments
do, or do not do. 97 In general, citizens respond that they are happy with
the services they receive, but they want the same services for lower
94. JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 92 (2nd ed. 1988).

95. Kok Kheng Yeoh, Ethnic Fragmentation and the Size of the Public Sector:
Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 3-4 n.2 (Univ. Malaya, FEA Working Paper No.
2001-5, 2001), available at http://www.cassey.com/fea200l-5.pdf.
96. Steven C. Deller, Modeling the Public Sector, in COMMUNITY POLICY ANALYSIS
MODELING 97, 114-15 (Thomas G. Johnson et al. eds., 2006).
97. David Lowery & Lee Sigelman, Understandingthe Tax Revolt: Eight Explanations,
75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963, 965-66 (1981).
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taxes. Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser find evidence that voters in
Massachusetts are unhappy with the stringency of the limits of
Proposition 21h."

One argument is that budgets in general are of the appropriate size
because if they do not meet the demands of citizens, which include the
demand that they are well-administered, citizens will vote the officials
out of office. It should also be noted that most public services are
normal goods; as incomes go up, citizens demand more and better
quality public services.' This does not mean that demand rises at the
same rate as income." For some goods, demand may rise more slowly
than does income, while for others, it may rise more rapidly.1" Thus, an
increasing public budget is not prima facie evidence that the budget is
inefficient.
On the other hand, the median voter model suggests that when
citizens vote, it is the preference of the median voter that rules. All of
those who want more than what the median voter wants will vote in
favor, and those who want less will vote against. This suggests that at all
times, roughly half the voters will think government is too large, and
roughly half will think it is too small.
Several hypotheses suggest that public budgets will be larger than
the optimum for social welfare. The following summarizes the major
ones. Agency theory suggests that bureaucrats have jobs with high
levels of discretion, making it difficult to supervise them. ', Thus, they
will seek to maximize their budgets as a way to increase their selfimportance. This is sometimes referred to as the Leviathan hypothesis,
or more colloquially, "bloated government. '0 3 Another hypothesis is
that interest groups provide votes to elected officials, and in return,
officials support specific budget items for the benefit of the interest
group.' A related argument is that budgets increase when there is an

98. David M. Cutler et al., Restraining the Leviathan: Property Tax Limitations in
Massachusetts,71 J. PUB. ECON. 313,327 (1999).

99. Reschovsky, supra note 10, at 146.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Cutler et al., supra note 98, at 319-20.
103. This hypothesis is also referred to as the Niskanen or Buchanan hypothesis and is a
central tenet of the public choice school of thought.
104. Cutler et al., supra note 98, at 320.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:497

economic or social shock, but do not return to previous levels when the
shock recedes. 05
While many hypotheses attempt to explain the size of public
budgets, only a few attempt to directly tie the public budget to economic
growth. One argument is that if the public budget is inefficient, it is
using resources that could be used elsewhere to better benefit society.
Another implicitly assumes that the public budget will outbid the
private sector for resources (such as a public wage premium). This will
increase costs to the private sector, lowering private investment and
employment.
This argument seems to be based on the implicit
assumption that the private use of the money is more productive than
the public use. A few hypotheses draw more direct links to the relative
size of public budgets and economic growth and will be discussed below.
B. Fiscal:Processes and Institutions
Mullins argues that, on the whole, local TELs have more impact on
the process of local government than on local budgets.' °
Local
governments will look for ways to relieve their fiscal constraints by
increasing sales taxes, fees, and charges if these are permitted."° They
may also increase the use of special districts for funding of services or
for economic development." The use of special districts can confuse
local voters as they no longer understand which government controls
what and who is responsible."9 This leads to diffusion of authority and
perhaps less voter oversight, a version of fiscal illusion."'
Mullins goes on to argue that these second-best solutions, adopted
because of the constraints imposed by TELs, lead to inefficiencies
because of the time and effort put into devising and using an alternative
rather than determining the best way to achieve the goal."' The use of
these second-best alternatives also has consequences. For example, the
increasing reliance on sales tax revenues by local governments increases

105. As noted by Yeoh, these perspectives are at times referred to as Peacock's and
Wiseman's law. Yeoh, supra note 95, at 3 n.2.
106. Mullins, supra note 38, at 113.
107. Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Deller, supra note 96, at 114-15.
Id.
Mullins, supra note 38, at 118.
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If the
sprawl, which increases the costs of providing public services.
use of special districts results in less voter oversight, budgets may
become larger and less well managed.
An additional major change in fiscal processes can happen if TELs
that apply to local governments pass power from the local government
to the state. California's Proposition 13 basically passed control of
property tax revenues to the state. At the same time, because people
have paid their property tax, they are confused when local services are
not up to their expectations. These changes point to fiscal illusionlocal taxpayers are not sure where their tax dollars are going.'13 The
flow of their taxes to the state and the flow from the state back to local
governments confuses voters, perhaps causing fiscal illusion, which can
introduce significant inefficiencies in the provision of public services. 14
C. Economic Impacts of TELs
Baumol argues that productivity increases more slowly in the public
than in the private sector because the public sector mainly provides
Services would become progressively more expensive
services." 5
relative to physical goods because of low productivity growth in services
and because wage increases from more productive sectors would
inevitably flow into the service sector.1 16 In fact, labor itself is the object
of consumption in much of the service sector, and thus, productivity will
increase only slowly.

17

Labor-intensive services, such as health care,

cannot substitute capital for labor as efficiently as the general economy,
so the cost of producing them goes up faster than general inflation.
Government ends up taking on these "inefficient" services-public
safety, education, long-term care, and other care-based health
services." 8 Thus, Baumol's argument is that wage increases in the
private sector due to productivity increases will force the public sector
(and the private service sector) to pay higher wages even though their

112. BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN AND METRO. POLICY, GROWTH IN THE
HEARTLAND: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MISSOURI 4 (2002), available at

http:www.brook.edu /es/urban/Missouri/Mol-16.pdf.
113. Douglas, supra note 53, at 224.
114. See Deller, supra note 96, at 114-15.
115. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS-THE
ECONOMIC DILEMMA 162-72 (1966).

116. See id. at 169-71, 180.
117. See id. at 171.
118. See generally id.
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productivity is not increasing as rapidly. " 9 Baumol goes on to state that

the final outcome for public budgets may be fewer social services even
though per capita incomes are growing."
The literature examining the relationships between tax and
expenditure limitations and economic activity is surprisingly sparse. 2'
As outlined above, the vast majority of the literature is focused on how
TELs have impacted state and local governments from a purely fiscal
perspective. However, there are many speculative assertions; for
example, in Mason's review of the Colorado Economic Futures Panel,
he concludes that TELs "fail to realize that wise public investments can
pay big dividends in creating a 12healthy economy and attracting job
growth and business investment."'
Only two studies of which we are aware provide a rigorous
examination of the issue, and both have a narrow focus.' 23 McGuire and
Rueben 24 focus on the impact of TABOR on the Colorado economy,
and Poterba and Rueben' 25 focus on employment in the public sector as
well as public sector wages in comparison to the private sector (i.e., the
public sector wage premium).
McGuire and Rueben concluded that Colorado's TABOR had little
if any impact on the long-term economic growth, measured in terms of
both employment and per capita income.' 26 They observed a short-run27
positive impact, but over time that positive influence disappeared.'
Although Poterba and Rueben look at a larger geographic area, they
focus only on public sector employment and wages.'2 States with more
restrictive TELs on local governments tend to have a lower public wage
premium and lower rates of growth in public sector employment. 2 9 The
public wage premium is particularly important in many communities
because public sector jobs tend to have higher levels of wages, salaries,

119. Id. at 179.
120. See generally id.

121. See McGuire & Rueben, supra note 7; see also Poterba & Rueben, supra note 27.
122. K.C. Mason, Panel's Report: Tax Limitations Jeopardize State's Economic Future,
ST. TAX NOTES, Aug. 15, 2005, at 487, 488.
123. See McGuire & Rueben, supra note 7; see also Poterba & Rueben, supra note 27.
124. McGuire & Rueben, supra note 7.
125. Poterba & Rueben, supra note 27.
126. See generally McGuire & Rueben, supra note 7.
127. Id.
128. Poterba & Rueben, supra note 27, at 385.
129. Id.
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and benefits packages.'" In smaller and more rural communities, public
sector jobs are often the "best" jobs available.
In general, research finds that local TELs, because of their emphasis
on limiting property taxes, tend to negatively affect school districts" ' the local government most dependent on property taxes and which also
Research shows that
uses large amounts of highly-skilled labor.
particularly student's math scores are negatively affected in districts
subject to TELs.132 There is also some evidence that states with limits
tend to draw reduced quality entrants into the teaching force.'33
While Baumol focused on how the private sector affects public
budgets, 34 another body of literature focuses on how public budgets
affect the private sector. In general, these focus on taxes as a cost to
business. Any cost to business, such as labor costs, can reduce returns to
investment. For any cost, the firm focuses on what the cost gets itlabor produces output and a higher unit cost of labor might result in
higher output and a lower cost of labor per unit of output. Taxes
provide public services to the firm, which may lower its private costs of
doing business. A firm will treat taxes as a cost and look for its lowest
cost for the public services it needs.
C. Relationships Between Taxes and Economic Activity
As discussed above, the relationship between taxes and expenditures
and economic activity has been a hot topic of political, popular, and
academic debate for decades. Beginning with the classic SamuelsonTiebout debate concerning the efficiency of markets to determine
optimal levels of public taxation and spending, academics and
130. Id. at 384.
131. See David N. Figlio, Did the "Tax Revolt" Reduce School Performance?65 J. PUB.
ECON. 245, 266 (1997); Thomas A. Downes & David N. Figlio, Do Tax and Expenditure
Limits Provide a Free Lunch? Evidence on the Link Between Limits and Public Sector Service
Quality, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 117-18 (1999) [hereinafter Downes & Figlio, Do Tax and

Expenditure Limits Provide a Free Lunch?]; Thomas A. Downes & David N. Figlio, School
Finance Reforms, Tax Limits, and Student Performance: Do Reforms Level Up or Dumb
Down? 34 (Inst. For Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1142-97, 1997) [hereinafter
Downes & Figlio, School Finance Reforms], available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publicationsl
dps/pdfs/dp14297.pdf; Thomas A. Downes et al., Do Limits Matter? Evidence on the Effects
of Tax Limitations on Student Performance,43 J. URB. ECON. 401, 412-14 (1988).

132. Downes & Figlio, Do Tax and Expenditure Limits Provide a Free Lunch?, supra
note 131, at 117-18; Downes & Figlio, School FinanceReforms, supra note 131, at 34; Downes
et al., supra note 131, at 412-14.
133. Downes & Figlio, Do Tax and Expenditure Limits Provide a Free Lunch?, supra
note 131, at 120-21.
134. BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 115.
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policymakers have struggled to define and apply appropriate rules.
Parallel to the purely public finance question is the issue relating
taxation levels to economic activity. Advocates of economic growth
often are vocal critics of taxes. 3 ' Arguments are made that "excessively
high" tax burdens hinder business growth and that reducing tax rates
will spur growth sufficient to offset lost revenues. This line of reasoning
was made popular under the Reagan Administration's policy of
supplied-side economics and is embodied in the notion of the LafferCurve.
Taxes, however, are used to fund important public goods and
services that are vital to the proper functioning of the local economy.
Investment and maintenance expenditures in transportation systems,
waste-water treatment facilities, police and fire protection, public
educational services, and, increasingly, services that support more subtle
forms of quality of life such as parks and recreational services, have
been widely documented to enhance economic growth and
development. Debates at the local level over government expenditure
reductions are often heated with little support for elimination or
significant reductions in any particular service. While the general public
and the business community are generally in favor of tax reduction,
widespread disagreement usually erupts when spending cuts are
considered.
Ladd identifies five benchmark studies documenting the progression
of the thinking about local taxes and their impact on economic
growth: 136 Due, 137 Oakland,"3 Wasylenko, 139 Newman and Sullivan, ' ° and
Bartik."' In his 1961 survey of the literature on firm location, a common
means to examine economic activity, Due concluded that: "While the

135. See

BARTIK,

supra note 19, at 36-37.

136. LADD, supra note 19, at 83-84.

137. John F. Due, Studies of State-Local Tax Influences on Location of Industry, 14
NAT'L TAX J. 163 (1961).

138. William H. Oakland, Local Taxes and IntraurbanIndustrial Location:A Survey, in
13 (1978).
139. Michael J. Wasylenko, Evidence of Fiscal Differentials and IntrametropolitanFirm

METROPOLITAN FINANCING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT POLICIES

Relocation, 56 LAND ECON. 339 (1980) [hereinafter Wasylenko, Evidence]; Michael J.

Wasylenko, The Location of Firms: The Role of Taxes and Fiscal Incentives, in URBAN
GOVERNMENT FINANCE 155 (1981) [hereinafter Wasylenko, Location of Firms].
140. Robert J. Newman & Dennis H. Sullivan, Econometric Analysis of Business Tax
Impacts on Industrial Location: What Do We Know, and How Do We Know It?, 23 J.URB.
ECON. 215 (1988).
141. Timothy J.Bartik, The Effects of State and Local Taxes on Economic Development:
A Review of Recent Research, 6 ECON. DEV. Q. 102 (1992).
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statistical analysis and study of location factors ae by no means
conclusive, they suggest very strongly that the tax effects cannot be of
major importance."'1 12 Due based his conclusion that taxes are
inconsequential for firm location decisions on the finding that taxes
account for such a small percentage of operating costs."13 He concluded
that other costs associated with labor, land, and transportation
dominated the effects of any small variation in taxes across locales.1 " In
his update of Due's earlier work, Oakland accepted without question
the conventional wisdom founded by Due that taxes have little effect on
interstate or interregional location decisions. ' 5
Wasylenko expanded the discussion of taxation and local economic
activity by explicitly examining the notion of intraregional competition
for firms.1 "6 While the interpretation of the literature by Due and later
by Oakland concluded that taxes account for little in a firm's decision to
locate in one state or metro area over another, they did not address the
role of taxes in the selection of one locale within a metro area, for
example, over another within the same metro area.1 17 Citing a limited
number of statistical studies, Wasylenko concludes that statistical
evidence identifying a marginal role taxes play in intraregional firm
location is outweighed by other more relevant factors.1 " Wasylenko
suggests that the limited role taxes may play is due to the limited
variation in taxes across regions." 9 While Wasylenko attempts to
address this latter issue, he concludes that our thinking about and
measuring relative tax burden needs to be refined."
As noted by Ladd, the 1980s witnessed a proliferation of statistical
studies challenging the conventional wisdom advanced by Due and
reaffirmed by Oakland.'
Newman and Sullivan's attempt to
summarize this newer work found three distinct approaches: general
equilibrium, partial equilibrium adjustments, and dynamic adjustment
models. 5 2 Because of the escalation of studies and approaches,
142. LADD, supra note 19, at 83 (quoting Due, supra note 137, at 170).
143. Due, supra note 137, at 171.

144. Id. at 167.
145. LADD, supra note 19, at 86.
146. Wasylenko, Location of Firms,supra note 139, at 156.

147. Due, supra note 137, at 166-67; Oakland, supra note 138, at 28.
148. Wasylenko, Location of Firms,supra note 139, at 186-87.
149. Id. at 186.

150. Id. at 185.
151. LADD, supra note 19, at 89.
152. Newman & Sullivan, supra note 140, at 219-21.
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Newman and Sullivan conclude that the impact of local fiscal policy,
taxes in particular, on economic activity through firm location "should
be treated as an open rather than a settled question" and are
encouraged by the introduction of new theoretical approaches,
empirical data, and sophistication of econometric methods.'53
Perhaps the most influential review of this literature was conducted
by Bartik. Using a modified delphi method summarizing fifty-seven
empirical interregional and twenty-five intraregional studies conducted
since 1979, Bartik provides compelling evidence that taxes do matter in
economic growth." While previous reviews of the literature discussed
individual studies, Bartik's use of delphi methods allows for systematic
"averaging" of results across studies.'55 While individual studies may
have limitations, there would have to be serious systematic error cutting
"across all studies for the consensus results to be invalid."' 5 6 In striking
contrast to the previous reviews of the literature, Bartik concluded "that
' 7
taxes have quite large and significant effects on [economic] activity." 11
Of the fifty-seven interregional studies reviewed, 70% reported at least
one statistically significant negative effect of taxes on one or more
measures of economic activity such as employment, output, or business
capital. 8 Ladd argues, "this observation alone suggests that the
conventional wisdom that taxes do not matter deserves to be
questioned."'5 9
More recently, Pjesky attempted to replicate and expand on what he
identified as five "influential" studies that support the new conventional
wisdom that taxes at the local (state) level do matter for regional
economic performancel": Vedder, 6' Becsi, 62 Helms, 63 Mofidi and
M

153. Id. at 232.
154. Bartik, supra note 141.
155. Id. at 103.
156. LADD, supra note 19, at 92.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Rex J. Pjesky, What Do We Know About Taxes and State Economic Development?
A Replication and Extension of Five Key Studies, 32 J. ECON. 25,26 (2006).
161. Id. at 27 (citing Richard Vedder, Taxation and Econ. Growth: Lessons for
Oklahoma (1996) (unpublished contract study, Office of State Finance, State of Oklahoma)).
162. Id. at 27-31 (citing Zsolt Becsi, Do State and Local Taxes Affect Relative State
Growth?, 81 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 18-36 (1996)).
163. Id. at 31 (citing L. Jay Helms, The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic
Growth: A Time Series-CrossSection Approach, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 574 (1985)).
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Stone,' 6 and Carroll and Wasylenko.'65 Through Pjesky's replication
effort, he concluded that the estimated tax effects identified in these five
studies were sensitive to model specification and time periods
examined.' 66 In several alternative specifications of the models, Pjesky
found that tax prices had a positive, not negative, and significant impact
on regional economic growth.'6" Pjesky concluded that due to a range of
empirical and theoretical short comings of the literature, we cannot
make any definitive statements about the relationship between local
taxes and regional economic activity.'" Pjesky suggests that perhaps
McGuire best summarizes our current understanding in "that we are
uncertain about the effects of economic development policies, including
broad state fiscal policy, on economic growth."' 69
White suggests that Due's conventional wisdom and Bartik's
challenge may both be right.'7
She argues that the idea of firms
becoming more sensitive to taxes over the past thirty or forty years is
intuitively appealing.'71 According to White, first-order effects, such as
labor, land, and transportation costs, vary less across regions now than
they did in the past.'72 Because firms have become more footloose,
second-order effects, such as taxes, probably have become more
important.'73 Thus, both Due and Bartik may be correct. Perhaps more
important is the increased incidence of tax incentives at the local level to
influence firm locations. State and local governments are more willing
today to "go to war" to attract, retain, and promote economic growth
with tax incentives as a primary tool of war. In the end, taxes do have a
weak negative effect on economic activity, but more important is how
those tax dollars are spent.

164. Id. at 32 (citing Alaeddin Mofidi & Joe A. Stone, Do State and Local Taxes Affect
Economic Growth?, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 686 (1990)).
165. Id. at 32 (citing Robert Carroll & Michael Wasylenko, Do State Business Climates
Still Matter?-Evidenceof a Structural Change,47 NAT'L TAX J. 19 (1994)).
166. Id. at 36-37.
167. Id. at 36.
168. Id. at 37
169. Id. at 37 (quoting Therese J. McGuire, Who Benefits From State and Local
Economic Development Policies?, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 457, 458 (1992) (reviewing BARTIK, supra
note 19)).
170. Michelle J. White, Comment: Effects of Taxes on Economic Activity, in LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING

THE LINKS 108, 108-15 (1998).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Wasylenko, ina second review of the literature on the link between
taxation and economic growth published at about the same time as
Ladd, points out that even though there are a large number of studies,
their results are not yet conclusive, and the effects of taxes may be
changing over time. 174 Estimates of interregional tax elasticities vary
over time, such as the source of data and variables used-employment,
income, investment, or firm locations. 17 The estimates suggest that a
10% decrease in taxes will increase employment, investment and firm
births between 1% and 6%. 76 When only business taxes are used, a
10% decrease in taxes increases economic activity between 0% and
2.6%.'"

Contrary to White, Wasylenko finds that over time tax

differences between states have become less important in employment
growth, perhaps because states have adopted similar tax systems. 178 The
intraregional tax elasticities are about four times higher than the
interregional elasticities. 179 Once a firm has narrowed its search to a
region, cost variations, other than taxes, are likely to be minimal. "8° This
increases the firm's responsiveness to tax differentials."18
At the same time, following a general strategy of low corporate
income tax rates does not guarantee long-term economic success. A
lower corporate rate reduces the cost of capital and leads to substitution
of labor for capital by all firms.'2 At the same time, the firms that find
the lower tax rate a sufficient incentive to relocate are the less capital
183
intensive firms because their re-location costs are relatively low.
States with lower corporate income tax rates have more labor-intensive
manufacturing, using low-wage, unskilled labor, than do states with
higher rates because the low-tax incentive for relocation by laborintensive firms "counteracted the capital upgrading [of] firms already
there."' 8' Southern states, which led in the drive for lower corporate tax
rates, starting with the Mississippi Balancing Agriculture with Industry

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Wasylenko, supra note 19, at 37-38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Jonathan C. Rork, Getting What You Pay For: The Case of Southern Economic

Development, 35 J. REG'L ANALYSIS & POL'Y 38, 38 (2005).

183. Id.
184. Id.
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("BAWI") action initiated in the Great Depression,1 85 increased
employment in the short run, but they also more recently became
particularly vulnerable to jobs moving overseas.
A large, but somewhat inconclusive, amount of literature on taxation
and economic growth can be found. While overall the literature
suggests that lower taxes may increase economic growth, the range of
estimates is quite large.'8 In addition, there may be different effects in
the short run and the long run, as suggested by Rork."" The intent of
the analysis presented in this Part of the study is to address three issues.
First, what is the relationship between levels of taxes and expenditures
on economic activity as measured by per capita income? Second, we
return to our simple examination of public sector employment discussed
above and look at correlates between the size of the public sector,
measured in terms of employment, and overall employment growth. We
then turn to the question of whether tax and expenditure limitations
have any role in explaining growth in per capita income.
IV. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF WISCONSIN

Wisconsin's current TEL limits apply only to the property tax.
Counties and municipalities are entering the second year of a limit on
their property tax levies. Under law, a county or municipality cannot
increase its levy by more than the percentage change in net new
construction or 2%, whichever is greater.1 88 Debt and tax increments
from tax increment financing ("TIF") districts are excluded from the
levy limit. 189 Towns under 2000 in population can approve a resolution
at the annual town meeting to exceed the levy limit.' 9° In all other
municipalities and counties, these limits can be lifted only through local
referendum.' 9
Because Wisconsin does not have a municipal level optional sales tax
and state law strictly limits how fees and charges can be structured and
used, the prospect for these constraints to become binding is very
high. 192 Exceeding the levy limit is penalized dollar for dollar by a

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 41.
Bartik, supra note 141, at 103.
Rork, supra note 182, at 50-51.
WIS. STAT. § 66.0602 (2005-2006) (repealed Jan. 1, 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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decrease in state aid. 193 Wisconsin is somewhat unusual in the generous
amount of state aid provided to local governments.
For school districts, property tax revenues are allowed to increase by
about $241 per student, increasing over time by the rate of inflation. 94
In practice, this translates into about a 2% annual allowable increase in
property tax revenues. A complicating factor in Wisconsin is what is
referred to as "qualified economic offer" ("QEO"). 195 That is, in
contract negotiations, under some circumstances, the QEO is set at
3.8% annual increases in wages, salary, and benefits (including health
care).' 96 Given that the largest share of a school district's budget is
devoted to teachers and professional teaching staff, the 3.8% QEO,
coupled with an effective 2% increase in property tax revenues, has
caused profound structural deficits in many Wisconsin school districts. 197
One of the factors driving the tax and expenditure limitation efforts
in Wisconsin is the state's reputation as a high-tax, and hence highspending, state.1 98 Historically, Wisconsin has been progressive in terms
of its commitment to offering a wide range of services and has taken
pride in the quality of its public educational system, including K-12
education, and its public university system and network of technical
schools." While college entrance exams, such as the ACT and SAT, are
but only one measure of student performance, on average, Wisconsin
high school students consistently rank in the top five in the nation, and
in some years (e.g., 2004), Wisconsin test scores rank the highest in the
nation.2" The University of Wisconsin - Madison is proud of the fact
that it ties Harvard University with the most Fortune 500 corporations
that have UW alumni as Chief Executive Officers ("CEOs"). 0 1 The
progressive ideas that drove much of these investments in public
services maintained that services should be open to as many of the
193. Id.
194. Andrew Reschovsky, Wisconsin's School Finance: A Policy Primer, ST. TAX
NOTES, Feb. 17, 2003, at 608-16.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Reschovsky, supranote 10, at 137-38.
199. Dale J. Knapp & Todd A. Barry, Wis. Taxpayer's Alliance, Why Are Wisconsin's
Taxes High?, 5-6 (2003), http://www.wistax.org/news-releases/2003/why%20high%20taxes.
pdf.
200. Press Release, Wis. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, SAT Scores Up, State's Graduates
Among Tops in the Nation (Aug. 30, 2005).
201. University of Wisconsin - Madison, Intersection of Business and Research
Explored at CEO Summit, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.news.wisc.edu/12947.html.
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citizenry as possible. As such, the idea of relying on fees and user
charges, such as the adoption of a toll road system that is so common
throughout states in the northeast United States, was in conflict with the
progressive philosophy. The combined elements of the progressive
philosophy and commitment to quality resulted in high taxes. 0 2 The
question we want to address is whether the perception that Wisconsin
remains a high tax and spend state with bloated government
employment has some basis in numbers.
To address the issue of the level of state and local taxes and
spending, we use two sources of information. The first is the U.S.
Census Bureau statistics on state and local government finance for 2004,
the most current year with detailed tax and expenditure data available
for all fifty states. 2 3 The second is employment data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis Regional Economic Information System ("BEAREIS"). 2°4 While state comparisons of taxes and expenditures are
widely available as the source of numerous popular press articles in
Wisconsin as well as other states, comparison of public sector
employment is not as widely available. We consider the financial and
then employment data in turn.
Within the public finance literature, there are two common ways in
which to analyze state and local government fiscal burden. One is to
compute taxes and expenditures on a per person or per capita basis.
However, per capita comparisons do not really allow us to address the
argument that Wisconsin's tax and expenditure burden is beyond the
state's ability to pay; that is, it does not take income into account. With
the latter measure, if taxes and expenditures are calculated as a
percentage of income, we can infer that for every dollar of income, a
certain percentage goes to taxes and expenditures. 25 Higher tax and
spending burdens would be reflected in taxes and spending as a higher
202. Knapp supra note 199.
203. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 13.
204. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local Area Personal Income, http://www.bea.gov/
bea/regional/reis (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
205. One complicating factor when computing tax and expenditures as a percentage of
income is which measure of income is most appropriate. Some analysts use wage and salary
income, while others use total personal income. A second problem is that different sources of
income data use slightly different methods for estimating income. The problem then is that
two different analysts can use different definitions of income from different sources and end
up with different per income estimates. This has resulted in some confusion in Wisconsin
where different analysts are reporting slightly different estimates and hence rankings. In
political debates, the estimates that support predefined positions are used. For this research,
we use total personal income as defined within the BEA-REIS.
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percentage of income. While these comparisons are helpful, simple
rankings do not allow us to address the relevant question, are tax and
expenditure levels "too high," because this is a normative judgment
upon which reasonable people can disagree.
Tax and expenditure levels per capita and as a percentage of income
were computed for all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and
Wisconsin's ranking is reported in Table 4.2 6 The Census data provide
great detail in terms of revenue and expenditure categories, far greater
detail than is required for this analysis. Hence, we select some of the
broader categories of revenues and expenditures for comparison. We
will consider first sources of revenue then areas of expenditures.
For our discussion, we focus on four broad sources of revenue:
income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, and fees and charges. We do
not consider intergovernmental transfers (grants in aid from the federal
government or other states).0 7 In general, taxes (property, income, and
sales) account for 11.5% of total personal income in Wisconsin, which is
higher than the national average of 10.4%.2' This places Wisconsin in
the top ten states in terms of tax burden with a rank of seventh.
Wisconsin taxes per capita are $3714, versus the national average of
$3447, but Wisconsin falls out of the top ten and ranks at thirteenth.
The change in the rankings between per income and per capita is easily
explained by the general level of income in Wisconsin when compared
to the rest of the nation. Wisconsin's per capita income has historically
ranked below the national average and, during the most recent
recession, has fallen farther behind.' This observation might be used as
evidence that income levels are not sufficient to support the level of
services available in Wisconsin.
A closer look at the major taxes may provide insight into how
Wisconsin ranks relatively high in terms of total taxes. Property taxes
206. State and local taxes and expenditures are combined because of differences
between states in the allocation of taxing authority and public service responsibilities. For
example, in some southern states, roads are the responsibility of states, while in other states,
both the state and local governments share responsibility for roads. Thus, to compare just
state spending on roads would be misleading.
207. The flow of federal dollars into the state has been a source of frustration for many
in Wisconsin; the state has consistently sent more dollars to Washington, DC, than is received
in grants in aid and contracts. Some have argued that the Wisconsin delegation in
Washington has not been effective in "bringing home the pork," while others note that
Wisconsin does not have much of a presence with the Department of Defense in terms of
military bases or defense contractors.
208. See infra Table 4.
209. Knapp & Barry, supra note 199, at 15.
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are 4.2% of personal income in Wisconsin, compared to 3.3% for the
national average, or a ranking of eighth in the nation. This level of
property tax, coupled with the general disdain for the property tax, may
be one of the motivations for the current local TELs targeting property
taxes in Wisconsin. Three percent of personal income in Wisconsin goes
to personal income tax, compared to a national average of 2.2%, and
0.4% of personal income is dedicated to the corporate income tax,
compared to 0.3% for the national average.21° Wisconsin falls below the
national average both in terms of the percentage of personal income
going to sales tax as well as per capita burdens. This is partially a
reflection of the fact that municipalities in Wisconsin are not allowed to
impose a sales tax. 1T
In states that allow a local option sales tax, a large percentage of
municipalities and counties (if permitted) have adopted the tax.
Three reasons have been advanced for the widespread use of a local
option sales tax when allowed by state law. First, because of the wide
disdain for the property tax, many municipalities see sales tax revenues
as a substitute for property tax revenues. Second, sound taxation policy
strongly suggests that the revenue base of the government must be able
to grow with the economy. Because of the growth of the retail and
service sectors, many municipalities have found that growth in the sales
tax provides them with a growing source of revenues. Third, and the
most relevant to the analysis presented in this study, is that as states
impose strong restrictions (i.e., TELs) on property taxes, many
municipalities are shifting away from the property tax to alternative
213
sources of revenue, with a local sales tax proving to be very attractive.
Wisconsin does not allow a local option sales tax, so local governments
cannot shift away from the property tax to the sales tax.
In addition to the general sales taxes, there are sales taxes on
particular types of items such as motor fuel and the so-called "sin" taxes
on tobacco and alcohol. In Wisconsin, the motor fuel tax, the revenues

210. It is important to note that, technically, personal income does not directly pay the
corporate income tax. The tax is paid by businesses, and one could argue that the tax
But the location of those
subtracts from potential dividends paid to shareholders.
shareholders is generally unknown and they may reside outside of Wisconsin.
211. Counties are allowed to impose a 0.5% sales tax that piggybacks on the state sales
tax. To date, fifty-nine out of seventy-two counties in Wisconsin have opted to impose a
county sales tax.
212. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Rogers, Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) Policy on the Urban
Fringe, 34 J. REG'L ANALYSIS & POL'Y 27, 32 (2004).
213. Mullins, supra note 38, at 113.
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of which are dedicated to highways and transportation, has historically
had automatic increases tied to the inflation rate. This past summer, in
response to the price of gasoline, that automatic increase was rescinded
and now can only be increased by legislative action. Within weeks of
the rescinding of the automatic increases, the Wisconsin Department of
Transportation released a report stating that increased fuel and material
costs have caused a massive deficit in the highway maintenance and
construction fund.2 4
In addition to shifting toward sales taxes, many local governments
across the nation that are limited by TELs on property taxes have been
able to shift toward higher dependence on user fees and changes.
Wisconsin tends to be close to, if not below, the national average on fees
and charges, as presented in Table 4. Because of the strong progressive
tradition in Wisconsin, the state has historically shied away from fees
and charges. Indeed, Wisconsin takes great pride in not having toll
roads. Further evidence that the progressive spirit remains strong in
Wisconsin came with the proposal to allow libraries to compensate for
the potential loss of state aid by imposing a fee for library cards. The
uproar was deafening. The common argument against the proposal was
that the predominant users of public libraries were the people who
could least afford to pay a user fee, an argument in line with traditional
progressive ideals. The Governor reluctantly withdrew the proposal,
and library cards remain free in Wisconsin.1 5
A second complication for the adoption of user fees and charges is
that Wisconsin law limits what a municipality and school district can do
with such fees. Specifically, the Wisconsin Constitution mandates that
K-12 public education be provided free to the residents of the state.
Therefore, schools cannot impose tuition for normal classroom
activities. In response to the fiscal constraints that the state has imposed

214. Studies that have looked at the status of the states' road conditions have generally
found Wisconsin's highway system to be among the best in the nation. But see, e.g., NORMAN
WALZER & STEVEN C. DELLER, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, RURAL ROADS AND
BRIDGES: CONDITION AND STATUS OF ROADS (1997), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/

lib/12000/12100/12198/IIRAOther_189.pdf (reporting on the status and condition of roads
that are maintained by local town or county governments nationwide).
215. A common phenomena that we find when we work with smaller communities in
economic development, inevitably one member of the community will raise the issue of high
taxes hindering economic growth and development. When we rephrase the question about
whether or not the community can afford the current level of services and we start soliciting
ideas for what to cut, the tone of the discussion shifts very quickly. Without a doubt, all
services that have any meaningful impact on the level of taxation are deemed too important
to the community.
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on K-12 public education, some school districts are imposing fees for
extracurricular activities such as participation in sports and school clubs.
In addition, the level of pressure for extracurricular clubs and groups to
pursue fundraising is growing rapidly. By law, revenues from fees and
charges can only be used for the municipal services that the fee is
applied to; fees cannot be structured to generate a surplus for other
uses. This limit greatly reduces the flexibility that fees and charges can
provide to help offset the TELs placed on property taxes.
A focus on expenditures provides a slightly different picture than a
Direct expenditure by the state and all local
focus on taxes.
is
equal
to 24% of personal income, slightly more than the
governments
national average of 23.3%, which ranks Wisconsin twenty-second in the
nation. 16 On an expenditures per capita basis, Wisconsin is slightly
below the national average ($7705 versus $7712). The specific areas of
expenditures on which Wisconsin ranks highest include education, both
K-12 and higher education, along with police protection and
corrections. But it is important to note that none of these rankings place
Wisconsin within the top ten states. One area of public expenditures
that receives significant attention is administration. It is often presumed
that too much is spent on administration, and that this is an area for
cutting costs. Given the 2004 data, Wisconsin ranks thirty-seventh in
terms of share of personal income spent on administration and thirtyninth in terms of per capita spending. These data provide a strong
challenge to the idea that there is significant administrative "bloat" in
Wisconsin's administrative spending.
An alternative way to measure expenditures and the size of the
public sector is to examine employment levels. If the Leviathan (or
Niskanen-Buchanan) 217 government as outlined above exists, then
wasteful and bloated government should be captured by the size of
government employment relative to the overall size of the state's
economy. Although a large share of government spending may take the
form of transfers (e.g., public support programs or economic
development grants), the provision of public services tends to be a
labor-intensive enterprise. For our purposes here, we look at public
sector employment, both at the state and local levels, between 1993 and
2004. The beginning of the period corresponds with the end of the early
1990's recession, and 2004 reflects the most current year of data
available. All data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce's
216. See infra Table 4.
217. See Cutler et al., supra note 98, at 319-20.
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Bureau of Economic Analysis's Regional Economic Information
System,218 and the results of our simple descriptive analysis are provided
in Table 5.
If we consider the percentage of total employment in state
government, the national average is 3%; for Wisconsin, it is 2.9%,
ranking thirty-seventh in the nation.219 Local government, which
includes counties, municipalities, K-12 public schools, and special
districts, accounts for a larger percentage of employment. At the
national level, local governments account for 8.1% of total employment,
and in Wisconsin, the share is slightly smaller, 8.0%, which ranks
Wisconsin just below the median at twenty-sixth in the nation. Thus,
public employment in Wisconsin appears typical to low in comparison
with other states. If the proponents of Wisconsin's TABOR and WTPA
are correct, we would expect to see Wisconsin's share of public sector
employment much higher.
A second way to think about the problem is to look at how public
employment levels have changed over time. Again, if government is
responding as suggested by the Leviathan hypothesis, the size of the
public sector would be expected to be growing faster than the overall
economy. As a baseline, consider total employment growth over the
1993 to 2004 period. National total employment grew by 20.1%, while
Wisconsin's total employment grew at a slower rate of 17.2%, which
places Wisconsin twenty-eighth in total employment growth when
compared to the other states. Generally, state-level public employment
grew more slowly than total employment. Nationally, state government
employment grew by 10%, while in Wisconsin it grew at 5.4%, which is
one of the slower paces among the fifty states (rank thirty-sixth). Local
government employment grew at a faster rate than state government
employment both for the nation (21.3%), as well as for Wisconsin
(16%). Nationally, local government employment grew faster than total
employment, but in Wisconsin, it grew more slowly than total
employment. Despite the widespread use of TELs imposed on local
governments throughout the nation, the demand for local public services
seems to be growing.
Two observations can be drawn from the employment analysis.
First, the relative size of Wisconsin's public sector is not out of
proportion with the national average. Second, over time, the public
218. See Rogers, supra note 212.
219. See infra Table 5.
220. See Cutler et al., supra note 98, at 319-20.
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sector share of total employment has been declining in Wisconsin. The
analysis, presented in Table 5, is too general to conclude that the current
restraints on the public sector in Wisconsin are having an effect, but the
analysis does challenge the idea of government growth in Wisconsin.
The one conclusion that we can reach is that Wisconsin is highly
dependent upon taxes as a source of revenue and local governments are
not permitted to aggressively pursue alternative sources of revenues,
such as user fees and charges. In addition, a recent attempt to be more
aggressive with these alternative sources of revenue ran into opposition
that comes from Wisconsin's traditional progressive ideas about the
availability of services."' in a sense, the public demand is pitting the
progressive philosophies of open access to public services against a more
conservative philosophy on taxes. As noted by Citrin, along with Joyce
and Mullins, Shapiro et al., and Granlich et al., 2z people are generally
satisfied with the current level of public services and would like to have
higher level of services, but are simply unwilling to pay for them. In
addition, Wisconsin's local governments are not permitted to pursue
alternative tax revenue streams, and Wisconsin does not allow a local
option sales tax.
A slightly different picture emerges when expenditures are
examined. Wisconsin does not rank high on overall expenditures, but it
does choose to dedicate higher levels of resources to some public
services than do other states.2z When the growth of public employment
is compared to the growth in total employment, it is clear that public
employment's share of total employment is declining. 2 ' This suggests
that the government is not growing excessively.
V. THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE IMPACT OF TELs ON

ECONOMIC GROWTH

The intent of the analysis presented in this Part of the study is to
address three issues. First, what is the relationship between levels of
taxes and expenditures on economic activity as measured by per capita
income? Second, we return to our simple examination of public sector
221. Knapp & Barry, supra note 199.
222. Jack Citrin, Do People Want Something for Nothing: Public Opinion on Taxes and
Government Spending, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1979); see Edward M.D. Rubinfield Gramlich &
D. Swift, Why Voters Turn Out for Tax Limitation Votes, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 115, 115 (1981);
Perry Shapiro, David Puryear & John Ross, Tax and Expenditure Limitation in Retrospect
and in Prospect,32 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 3 (1979); Joyce & Mullins, supra note 30, at 241.
223. See infra Table 4.
224. See infra Table 5.
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employment discussed above and look at correlates between the size of
the public sector, measured in terms of employment, and overall
employment growth. Third, we then turn to the question of whether tax
and expenditure limitations have any role in explaining growth in per
capita income.
A. Revenue and Expenditures and Per Capita Income

Our simple correlations of revenues and expenditures per income as
well as per capita on per capita income levels in 2004 are presented in
Table 6. Our central hypothesis flows from the position of the
advocates of TELs that higher tax burdens are bad for the economy.
But as noted by Bartik and Ladd, discussed above, looking at only the
revenue side of the equation paints an incomplete picture. While the
literature suggests that taxes may harm the economy, the services that
taxes pay for help the economy. 225

Consider first overall taxes as a percentage of income and taxes per
capita. Both measures are associated with higher levels of per capita
income. This result also holds for property taxes alone. Two
observations are warranted. It would be a mistake to try and infer from
simple correlation analysis that higher overall taxes as well as property
taxes lead to higher levels of economic activity as measured by per
capita income. Correlation does not lead to causation. But we can
conclude that there are no "low tax-high income" states. Although we
cannot draw a conclusion about causation, these simple results cast
doubt on a central premise of TEL advocates that high taxes are
necessarily bad for the economy.
When we examine the relationship between sales taxes and levels of
per capita income, a slightly more complex picture becomes apparent.
Sales taxes as a percentage of total income tend to be negatively
correlated with overall per capita income, yet sales taxes per capita tend
to be associated with higher levels of per capita income. One possible
interpretation is based on research showing that sales taxes are
regressive. Because in most states the sales tax tends to apply to goods
and not services, this interpretation is plausible for many states. As
income grows, a higher share of income is spent on services; hence, for
high-income states, a smaller share of income is spent on taxable goods.
Lower income persons, however, will tend to spend a higher percentage
of their income on taxable goods. The positive correlation between

225. Bartik, supra note 141, at 107.
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sales taxes per capita and per capita income again allows us to conclude
that there are no "low tax-high income" states.
State and local income taxes also have a complex relationship to per
capita income. Individual income taxes have a very weak positive
association with per capita income when measured as a percentage of
income, and a stronger positive relationship when measured in terms of
income taxes per capita. While we cannot draw inferences about
causation, we can again draw the conclusion that there are no "low taxhigh income" states. A similar, albeit weak, conclusion can be drawn in
terms of corporate income taxes as a percentage of personal income.
User fees and charges have a strong negative association with levels of
per capita income. What this latter result implies is that poorer states
tend to rely more heavily on fees and charges to generate revenues. In
summary, higher income states tend to rely more on taxes to generate
revenues while poorer states tend to turn to fees and charges to generate
revenues. This simple analysis does not allow us to make any inferences
about the role of TELs.
When we examine expenditures, we have a mixed set of results,
again pointing to the complexity of the relationship between taxes and
expenditures and economic activity. Direct total expenditures as a
percentage of income are not correlated with per capita income, but
direct expenditures per capita have a strong positive association with per
capita income. This latter pattern also holds for current operations
expenditures and capital outlays. Given that expenditures are the
flipside of revenues, it makes intuitive sense that higher income states
tend to have higher levels of spending per capita. Again, we cannot
draw the conclusion that higher levels of spending per capita cause
higher levels of income. The strongest result we can draw is that higher
income states tend to spend more per person than lower income states.
The results on education expenditures are surprising. When we
consider education expenditures as a percentage of personal income, we
find a negative relationship strongly suggesting that poorer states tend
to spend a higher percentage of their income on educational services.
This is particularly true for higher education, but the result is unclear
(statistically insignificant) with K-12 education. On the other hand,
there is a positive relationship between K-12 education spending per
capita and per capita income. That is, lower income states spend a
higher percentage of their income on public education, but higher
income states spend more per person. The interested reader can
explore the remaining correlations and draw their own inferences. But,
the simple analysis presented in this Part tells us that the relationship
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between taxes, other sources of revenue and expenditures and economic
activity is a complex one. Policymakers should use caution when
making broad generalizations about the relationship between taxes,
expenditures, and economic activity.
B. Public Sector Employment and Economic Growth

As we outlined above, there are numerous ways in which to measure
the size of government. The most common approach is to examine
flows of dollars through revenue generation (taxes, fees, charges, etc.)
and expenditures. Poterba and Rueben's study of the impact of TELs
on public sector employment suggests that we can gain insights into the
impact of government on economic growth by looking at patterns in
public sector and total employment. Here, we take the descriptive
analysis presented in Table 5 and search for correlations between public
sector employment and total employment growth.
As reported in Table 7, six specific correlates were estimated. First
consider overall growth in state as well as local government employment
and how they relate to total employment growth over the period 1993 to
2004. As we expected from the simple descriptive analysis, there is a
strong positive relationship between growth in government employment
and total employment growth. Based on these simple correlations, it
appears reasonable to conclude that local government employment
grows at a faster rate than state government employment. From a
policy perspective, these results strongly suggest that growth in public
sector employment is a product of total employment growth. This
makes sense if one thinks of public services as what economists refer to
as a normal good. As the economy grows, the demand for public
services, particularly local government services, also grows.
The question then becomes one of the rate of growth in the public
sector relative to total employment growth. By correlating the change
in public sector employment over the study time period with total
employment growth over the same period, we find a strong negative
statistical relationship. This result, coupled with the prior result,
suggests that the public sector employment grows at a slower rate than
total employment growth. Returning to Table 5, we find that growth in
Wisconsin public sector employment is consistent with these findings,
strongly suggesting that the growth in government is not "out of
control" as the advocates of Wisconsin's TABOR-WTPA have
maintained.
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The final correlation analysis concerns the size of public sector
employment in 1993 and its influence on total employment growth over
the study period. If the promoters of TELs are correct, we would expect
to find a negative relationship. In other words, states that have a higher
percentage of total employment in state and local government should
experience slower overall employment growth. Our simple statistical
analysis presented here refutes that conclusion. While the estimated
correlation is negative, it is very close to zero and cannot be statistically
distinguished from zero. In other words, states that had a higher share
of total employment in the public sector in 1993 did not experience a
statistically different rate of total employment growth than those with a
lower level of public employment.
The results of this simple growth analysis have straightforward
policy implications. The overall size of public employment does not
influence subsequent growth in total employment. As the economy
grows, the demand for public services also grows, which means that
employment in the public sector will also grow. The rate of growth in
public employment, however, is slower than overall employment
growth. The data for Wisconsin suggests that it is following the patterns
observed in Table 7.
C. The Impact of TELs on Economic Growth
The analysis presented to this point has not addressed our central
question: what is the impact of tax and expenditure limits on economic
growth? To gain insights into this question we follow the approach of
McGuire and Rueben by using panel data of the fifty states over the
period 1987 to 2004.26 Using regression analysis, we estimate a family
of growth models to explain patterns in annual growth of per capita
income. 27 The challenge we face is how to measure and introduce TELs
into the growth models. As noted above, no two states are completely
alike, but the proposed changes to the Wisconsin Constitution provide
us with some guidance. The current limits imposed on Wisconsin local
governments and the proposed amendments are among the strictest
forms of TELs. For local governments there are strict rules on how
quickly property tax levies are allowed to increase, while the proposed
TABOR would place strict restrictions on growth in expenditures, and
WTPA would place strict restrictions on the growth of revenues.
Therefore, we elected to use simple dummy variables to identify states
226. McGuire & Rueben, supra note 7.
227. See infra Table 8.
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that have imposed property tax levy limits at the local level as well as
revenue or expenditure limits on state governments. We estimate one
model using the local limitations and a second model using state-level
TELs.
Given the panel nature of our data coupled with the timeframes in
which states have or have not imposed such limits, we construct two
separate dummy variables for both the local and state levels. One
dummy takes on the value of one if states imposed such limits prior to
1987 and zero otherwise. The second dummy takes on a value of one if
the state imposes a limit after 1987, again zero otherwise. Therefore, we
have four specific dummy variables: yes or no if the state has imposed a
property tax levy limit on local governments prior to or after 1987 and if
the state has imposed a revenue or expenditure limit on state
government prior to or after 1987. To control for the effects of other
factors that influence growth in per capita income, we include a range of
other variables. These include:
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

Earnings Per Job;
Gross State Product as a Percentage of U.S. GSP;
Per Capita Income from Unemployment Insurance;
Per Capita Income from Retirement Sources;
Ratio of Farm to Non-farm Proprietors;
Percentage of Employment in Manufacturing;
Poverty Rate.

Earnings per job captures lagged growth and allows for an indirect
test of the convergence hypothesis that is popular within the economic
growth literature." The convergence hypothesis states that incomes
will converge over time with poorer states slowly catching up to richer
states. 2' 9 The state's share of Gross Domestic Product (or Gross State
Product or GSP) is intended to capture the relative size of the state's
economy. 23° Unlike convergence theory, endogenous growth theory
suggests that economies can be characterized as exhibiting economies of

228. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Convergence, 100 J. POL. ECON.
223 (1992); Steven C. Deller et al., Agriculture and Rural Economic Growth, 35 J. AGRIC. &

APPLIED ECON. 517, 520-26 (2003).
229. Barro, supra note 228, at 224.
230. Id. at 229-30.
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scale."' Within a growth framework, larger states have a comparative
advantage with respect to growth. 2
Per capita income from unemployment insurance is intended to
capture the effects of national recessions.233 Per capita income from
retirement sources is aimed at capturing the large impact of retirement
migration into southern, warmer climates. Although not all retirement
migration is limited to warmer, southern states, much of the rapid
growth of these states can be attributed to retirement migration. The
ratio of farm to non-farm proprietors is intended to capture the
dependence of the state economy on agriculture. The percentage of
employment in manufacturing is aimed at capturing the dependency of
the state economy on manufacturing. The hypothesis with these two
latter measures is that at the national level, neither agriculture nor
manufacturing are growth sectors, and higher levels of dependency on
either of these two sectors will act as a drag on the economy. Finally,
the poverty rate is intended to capture how a higher level of poverty can
represent a drain on the growth potential of the state's economy.
Given the panel nature of our data, there are several ways in which
we can estimate the model ranging from a Fuller specification to fixed as
well as random effects.'
For our study, we elected to use the Parker
approach where we explicitly allow for lagged time effects to enter into
the model through the error structure. 5 A total of six specifications of
the model are estimated with each model having a different combination
of TEL dummy variables.
Before turning to the regression analysis, we perform a set of simple
sub-sample equivalency tests where we look at the mean level of annual
growth in per capita income across states that have imposed TELs and

231. Id. at 240.
232. See id. at 241-45.
233. See infra Table 9.
234. For a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative methods of
estimating panel models within an economic growth framework, see Mark D. Partridge, Does
Income DistributionAffect U.S. State Economic Growth?, 45 J. REGIONAL SC. 363 (2005).
235. The model can be expressed formally as:
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those that have not, as defined above.26 The results of this simple
preliminary analysis are provided in Table 8. Per capita income in states
that have imposed property tax levy limits on local government prior to
1987 had an average annual growth rate of 4.38% in per capita income
versus 4.45% for those that had not imposed such a limit. While this
suggests that states with local property tax levy limits experienced
slightly slower growth in per capita income over this period, the
observed difference is not statistically significant. States that imposed a
property tax levy limit after 1987 grew slower (4.24%) than those that
had not imposed such a limit (4.44%). But again, the statistical tests of
equivalency suggest that these differences are not statistically different.
Contrary to what the advocates of property tax levy limits advance as an
economic growth motivation for imposing such limits, the data suggest
that such limits have no meaningful effect on growth in per capita
income.
When we consider the differences across states that have imposed a
revenue or expenditure limit on state government, we see a similar
pattern. States that imposed such limits prior to 1987 had an average
annual growth rate in per capita income from 1987 to 2004 of 4.35%,
while states that had not imposed such a limit prior to 1987 had an
average annual growth rate of 4.48%. The same pattern is present for
states that have imposed revenue or expenditure limits on state
governments after 1987. The statistical test, however, suggests that the
observed differences are not statistically significant. In other words, the
TELs imposed on a state's revenue or expenditures do not appear to
influence average growth levels.
The results of the complete model are presented in Table 9. In
general, the results for the control variables are consistent and
statistically significant across all six specifications of the growth model.
Higher levels of earnings per job have a positive, albeit small, impact on
the growth in per capita income. This is somewhat expected, but does
not lend support to the idea of convergence in income across states over
time. The negative coefficients on the state's share of U.S. gross
domestic product are somewhat surprising in light of endogenous
growth theory that suggests that larger economies have a comparative
advantage over smaller economies. One possible interpretation is that
smaller economies are catching up to larger economies; their per capita
incomes are growing more rapidly, which would be consistent with a
convergence hypothesis.
236. See infra Table 8.
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As expected, per capita income from unemployment insurance has a
negative impact on the growth rate of per capita income. Also as
expected, a higher level of per capita income from retirement sources
causes a modestly higher rate of growth in per capita income. States
that are attracting retirement migrants are experiencing faster economic
growth, all else held constant. Higher levels of dependency on
agriculture and manufacturing have a positive impact on economic
growth which is the opposite of what is expected. One potential
explanation is that while these are not growth sectors in and of
themselves, the jobs that are associated with these industries are higher
paying.237 Finally, higher levels of poverty are actually associated with
faster growth in per capita income.
This is again evidence of
convergence in income across states over time.
Turning attention to the set of dummy variables identifying states
with and without restrictive TELs on local governments, several
patterns are apparent. First, for states that imposed a property tax levy
limit on local governments prior to 1987, the limit does not appear to
have any predictive power in explaining growth in per capita income.
But states that imposed such a limit after 1987 appear to have had a
negative affect on income growth. This is the opposite of what the
advocates of property tax limits maintain. It appears instead that such
limits hinder economic growth. If we combine the two models and enter
both of the property tax levy limits variables into one model, the results
remain intact. One way to interpret these results is within a long- versus
short-term framework. In states where a local property tax limit has
been in place since before 1987, the local governments have had time to
identify strategies to maintain service levels and keep it from affecting
economic growth without resorting to the property tax.
Local
governments that have had to operate under property tax levy limits
over a shorter period of time have not yet been able to put in place
strategies to maintain service levels, and this has affected their economic
growth.
When we examine revenue or expenditure limits on state
governments, we get a very different result. In states with TELs
imposed prior to 1987, there is statistically weak evidence that revenue
and expenditure limits actually have a positive impact on the growth
237. One line of reasoning suggests that within agriculture, marginal farms are being
weeded out of the industry and only the most profitable farms remain in operation. There is
also evidence that many of the manufacturing jobs that are moving overseas tend to be lowerskilled, lower-paying jobs which means that the remaining manufacturing jobs require higher
levels of skills and higher pay.
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rate of per capita income. The same result holds for states that have
imposed such a limit after 1987. When we combine the two state TEL
limit variables in the same model, we find that the prior results are
stable: the statistical results suggest that revenue and expenditure limits
on state government have a positive impact on the growth of per capita
income.
We estimated the elasticity of TELs on per capita income growth.
We calculated the elasticity using the average coefficient across the two
models (one with only one dummy and the model with both dummies).
The size of the coefficients is similar in the two models. Because the
coefficients on the property tax levy limit before 1987 are insignificant,
the elasticity is zero. The elasticity on the property tax levy imposed
after 1987 is -0.00656%. States that imposed such a limit on local
governments after 1987 experienced a 0.66% lower growth rate in per
capita income. States that imposed a state TEL prior to 1987
experienced a 1.93% higher growth rate in per capita income. States
that imposed a TEL after 1987 experienced a 0.63% higher growth rate.
Given that the average growth in per capita income is 4.42%, a state
with a local property tax levy limit imposed after 1987 will experience an
average annual growth rate of 4.39%. A state with a TEL imposed prior
to 1987 has an average growth rate of 4.49%. A state with a TEL
imposed after 1987 has an average growth rate of 4.45%.
From this analysis, we can conclude that limits on local governments
may actually hinder economic growth. This could be caused by the
nature of services offered by local governments, including protective
services, water and waste treatment, and perhaps most importantly,
education. These are the types of services that people and firms seek
out when making location decisions. Hindering the ability of local
governments to provide these services may create bottlenecks in the
local economy, hence limiting economic growth. Limits placed on state
government, however, appear to have a different impact on economic
growth. It may be that services provided by state government are more
removed from citizens and firms. Thus, restrictions on state services
may not be felt by citizens as much as similar restrictions on local
governments. What this analysis cannot address is the role of state aids
(e.g., school aids) in this complex picture. These results cannot address
the very real case of state limits prohibiting the flow of aids to local
governments.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS

This study has provided an overview of the tax and expenditure
limitations movement on both local and state governments. There is a
long history of TELs on local government, while the movement to
impose them at the state level is more recent. Nearly all states have
some form of TELs on local governments. For this reason, the research
on TELs focuses on local governments. The research can be broken
into three categories: fiscal impacts of TELs, impacts of TELs on local
government processes, and impacts of TELs on economic growth.
While there is a large amount of literature on the impact of taxes on
economic growth, it is still inconclusive. In part, the impact of taxes on
economic growth may be changing over time. Tax differentials might
also have a larger impact in a small area, when there are few other
differences in costs for firms to respond. We could find only two studies
that address the impact of TELs on economic growth. One focuses on
local TELs and their impacts on local public sector wages compared
with private wages. The second limits its focus to Colorado and the
western states. Thus, our study is the first to take a broad look at the
impact of both local- and state-level TELs on growth in state per capita
income.
" While Wisconsin has historically been a high tax state, in terms of
expenditures, it does not appear to be out of line. Wisconsin's
progressive political philosophy results in a dependence on taxes
as opposed to alternative sources of revenue, such as fees and
charges.
* Correlation analysis finds that there are no "low tax-high
income" states.
* Growth in the public sector is a natural byproduct of overall
economic growth. Simple correlations indicate that the public
sector grows more slowly than the overall economy. Wisconsin
fits this pattern.
* Employment in the Wisconsin public sector does not appear to be
out of line with respect to other states.
* TELs imposed on local governments may have a negative impact
on the growth of per capita income in the short run. They do not
appear to affect economic growth in the longer run. On the
other hand, TELs imposed on state governments may have a
positive impact on economic growth. A possible explanation
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may be that the public services that matter most to the economy
are provided by local and not state governments.
This study should be viewed as one step forward in understanding
the implications of the size of government and TELs on economic
activity and growth. What we lack is a clear theoretical framework to
phrase our questions and craft the empirical work. As we have
reviewed, the literature is not wanting for theoretical arguments, but
there lacks a unifying framework to rigorously test our central
hypotheses. Part of the challenge is that the framework is not purely
economic or political, but rather it needs to be interdisciplinary. One
could even argue that sociology has something to bring to the table in
terms of the notion of "group think." As noted by many in the
literature, some of these TEL movements take on a life of their own.
In addition to trying to think through a more comprehensive
framework to think about TELs and economic growth, we also need to
refine our thinking about how we empirically measure TELs. Since
every state is different, our simple dummy variables are a gross
generalization. Our challenge is how we model such complexities into
an economic growth framework. Then, how is it operationalized for
empirical analysis? We believe that this fundamental problem is why
the vast majority of academic studies that are available tend to focus on
individual states in an almost case-study structure. But in order to draw
general inferences, we must move beyond these case studies. We
believe that this study is a step in that direction.
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TABLE 1

238
TYPES AND CLASSIFICATION OF TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS (TEL)

Overall Property Tax Rate Limitations
Limits on property tax rates are the most
common form of TEL. These limits are
on overall property tax rates and often
set a ceiling that the rate cannot exceed
without a vote of local citizens. These
limits can be circumvented through
alterations in assessment practices. If
the rate limits are matched with limits on
assessment increases, this TEL is
potentially binding.

General Revenue or Expenditure
Increases
This type of TEL limits the amount
that revenues and/or expenditures can

increase from the previous year. Often
tied to inflation rates or population
growth rates, this type of TEL is the
most binding for governments.

Specific Property Tax Rate Limitations

Limits on Assessment Increases

Same for overall property tax rate
limitations but targeted to specific units
of government (e.g., school districts,
counties) or narrowly defined service
areas.
These can be circumvented
through changes in assessment practices
or in the case of specific services through
interfund transfers.
As with overall
property tax rate limits, if the limit is
matched with limits on assessments, this
TEL is potentially binding.

Since the property tax collected is a
function of assessed property values,
coupled with the tax rate, this TEL
limits the rate at which the assessed
value of properties can be increased. If
there are no limits on the property tax
rate, governments dependent on the
property tax can bypass this TEL by
simply raising the property tax rate. If
this TEL is coupled with limits on the
property tax rate, the overall effect can
be binding on governments.

Property Tax Levy Limits

Full Disclosure - Truth in Taxation

This TEL limits the amount of revenue
that can be generated through the
property tax independent of the
property tax rate. These limits often
allow for a specific percentage increase
from one year to the next. The fixed
nature of this TEL makes it difficult to
circumvent except for a diversification
away from the property tax, for example,
by increasing fees, charges, and sales
taxes.

This type of TEL generally requires
some type of public discussions and
specific legislative vote prior to
enactment of tax rates or levy
increases. This TEL generally is not
binding and requires a simple vote of
the local legislative body to increase
taxes.

238. The information in this Table was taken Joyce & Mullins, supra note 30, at 242.
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TABLE 2
TEL

CURRENTLY IMPOSED ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

(ORIGINAL YEAR OF IMPOSITION/*AMENDMENT)

239

C = County; M = Municipality; S = School District
(r) Re pealed effective year specified / (s) Suspended effective year specified

0

-~

C

0,-

r~~ 01>
1972 CMS

1875 CM

AL

*1978 CMS

1916S

AK

-

1972 M

d a

.

1972 M
1921 CM
* 1980 CM
1913 CM

AZ

1980 CMS

AR

1883 CM

1974S

*1980 CM

1980 CMS

1981 CMS

2000 CMS

*1981 S

1978 CMS
CA

*1986 CMS

1979 CMS
1997 CMS

1978 CMS

1972S

-

1992 CMS

1990 CMS

1913 CM
CO

-

cr

-

DE

1992 CMS

1992 S

-

1972 C

1983 CM
1992 CMS

1992 S

1976 C

1968 CM

FL

1855 S

1974 CMS

*1968 S

*1980

*1973 S

1995 CMS

CMS

c.1890 C
*1982(r)
C
GA
HI

1945S

-

1991 CMS
1977 C

-

1913 C

ID

1978 CMS

1967 M

1979CMS

1963 S

*1992(r) CMS

1991 CMS

1991 CMS

1981 CMS

1939 C
IL

-

1961MS

239. The information in this Table is taken from Mullins & Wallin, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)
C = County; M = Municipality; S = School District
effective ear specified /(s) Suspended effective year specified

(Repealed
t-

t

E

CL
E

1)

)a

1973 CMS
1977 CMS
>

1980CMS

IN
n.a.
C
"1983
1972 M

1978 CMS

"1992M
IA

1989 S-"1980

-

CMS

19715S

1983 C

1973 S

-

1970 CM
KS

1933/89(s) CMS

-

"1989(s) CM

-

1908 C
1908 M
•*1985M

KY

-

LA
ME

1946S

1979CMS

1974 CMS

1978 CMS193-

1979CM

-

1957 CMS

MD

"

CM1991

CMS

-

1977 CM

1980M
"1991 M

MA

M
1980/83M

1949 M
MI

1933 CS

1994 S

1978 CMS

1982 CMS

CMS
CMS
1971CM

MN

1993(r) CM

-

1985 CMS

1980 CM
1983 S

MS
MO

M1909

1875CMS

S
1980 CMS

1

C

1

1931 C
C

91987

n.a. M
*1965 M
MT

1971S

1987 CM

1974 CMS
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)
C = County; M = Municipality; S = School District
(r) Repealed effective ear specified i(s) Suspended effective year specified

0

2

103

>E

1903C

E19

90 CM

"19

1957 M
1921 S
NE

-

*1999 S

E

90C

1996 CM
1991 5
1990 CM

* 1996 S

1990 CM

1983 C

NV

1936 CMS

1929 MS

1983 M

1984 CM

*1987 M

*1989(r) CM

1985 CMS

NH

1976 M
*1991 M
1976 S
NJ

-

-

1980 C

1973 CMS

"1990 S

1979 CMS

NM

1914 CMS

*1987 CMS

1979 CMS

NY

-

1894 CMS

-

NC

1973 CM

-

ND

1929 CMS

1981 CM

*2000 CMS
1981 C
1986 M

1929 CMS
*1934 CMS
OH

*1953 CMS

-

1976 CMS

OK

1933 CMA

-

-

1996 CMS

1997 CM
1991 S
OR

1991 CMS

PA

1959 CMS

RI

SC

*1997 S
c.1940 C
1985 M

-

1979 M

1975 CMS
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)
C = County; M = Municipality; S = School District
(r) Re pealed effective ear specified / (s) Suspended effective year specified

E~
EE

~

-

L=
m

SD

-

~

4)

0

1915 CMS
1979 CM

TN
1876 CM

TX

1888S

1982 CMS

1982 CMS

1898/61 C
1929 M

UT
VT

-

VA

-

1929S

1969 CMS

*1988 S

*1986(r) CMS

1986 CMS

1976 CM
1971 CM
*1979 CM
*2001 CM
1979 S

1944 CMS
WA

*1973 CMS

1973 CM

*2001 S

2000 CMS

WV

1939 CMS

1939 CMS

1990 CMS

-

WI

-

1994 C

1994S

1890 CM
WY

1911S

-

1990 CMS
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TABLE 3
STATE TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS 2005240
State
Alaska

Year

Constitution

Type of

Adopted

or Statute

Limit

1982

Constitution

Spending

Main Features of the Limit
A cap on appropriations grows yearly
by the increase in population and
inflation.

Arizona

1978

Constitution

Spending

California

1979

Constitution

Spending

Appropriations cannot be more than
7.41% of total state personal income.
Annual appropriations growth linked
to population growth and per capita
personal income growth.

Colorado

1991

Statute

Spending

General fund appropriations limited to
the lesser of (a) 5% of total state
personal income or (b) 6% over the

Colorado
(continued)

1992

Constitution

Revenue &
Spending

previous year's appropriation.
Most revenues limited to population
growth plus inflation. Changes
to
spending limits or tax increases must
receive voter approval.

Connecticut

1991

Statute

Spending

Spending limited to average of growth
in personal income for previous five
years or previous year's increase in
inflation, whichever is greater.

Connecticut
(continued)

1992

Constitution

Spending

Voters approved a limit similar to the
statutory one in 1992, but it has not
received the three-fifths vote in the
legislature needed to take effect.

Delaware

1978

Constitution

Appropriations

Appropriations limited to 98% of

to Revenue

revenue estimate.

Estimate

Florida

1994

Constitution

Revenue

Revenue limited to the average growth
rate in state personal income for
previous five years.

240. The information in this Table is taken from National Conference of State
Legislatures, supra note 32.
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

State

tate___

__

Hawaii

Year

Adopted

1978

Constitution
or Statute

Constitution

Type of Limit
Spending

Main Features of the Limit
General fund spending must be less
than the average growth in personal
income in previous three years.

Idaho

1980

Statute

Spending

General fund appropriations cannot
exceed 5.33% of total state personal
income, as estimated by the State
Tax Commission. One-time
expenditures are exempt.

Indiana

2002

Statute

Spending

Iowa

1992

Statute

Appropriations

State spending cap per fiscal year
with growth set according to formula
for each biennial period.
Appropriations limited to 99% of
the adjusted revenue estimate.

Louisiana

1993

Constitution

Spending

Expenditures limited to 1992
appropriations plus annual growth in
state per capita personal income.

Maine

2005

Statute

Spending

Expenditure growth limited to a tenyear average of personal income
growth, or maximum of 2.75%.
Formulas are based on state's tax
burden ranking.

Mass.

1986

Statute

Revenue

Revenue cannot exceed the threeyear average growth in state wages
and salaries. The limit was amended
in 2002 adding definitions for a limit
that would be tied to inflation in
government purchasing plus 2%.

Michigan

1978

Constitution

Revenue

Revenue limited to 1% over 9.49%
of the previous year's state personal
income.

Mississippi

1982

Statute

Appropriations

Appropriations limited to 98% of
projected revenue. The statutory
limit can be amended by majority
vote of legislature.

Missouri

1980

Constitution

Revenue

Revenue limited to 5.64% of
previous year's total state personal
income.
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
State
State___
Missouri,

Year
Adopted
1996

Constitution
or Statute
Constitution

Type of Limit
Revenue

Main Features of the Limit
Voter approval required for tax

(continued)

hikes over approximately $77 million
or 1% of state revenues, whichever is
Montana

1981

Statute

Spending

less.
Spending is limited to a growth index

Nevada

1979

Statute

Spending

based on state personal income.
Proposed expenditures are limited to
the biennial percentage growth in

New
Jersey

1990

Statute

Spending

state population and inflation.
Expenditures are limited to the

North
Carolina

1991

Statute

Spending

growth in state personal income.
Spending is limited to 7% or less of

Oklahoma

1985

Constitution

Spending

total state personal income.
Expenditures are limited to 12%

Oklahoma
(continued)

1985

Constitution

Appropriations

annual growth adjusted for inflation.
Appropriations are limited to 95%

Oregon

2000

Constitution

Revenue

of certified revenue.
Any general fund revenue in excess
of 2% of the revenue estimate must

Oregon

2001

Statute

Spending

be refunded to taxpayers.
Appropriations growth limited to

(continued)

8% of projected personal income for
Rhode
Island

1992

Constitution

Appropriations

biennium.
Appropriations limited to 98% of

South
Carolina

1980

Constitution

Spending

projected revenue.
Spending growth is limited by either
the average growth in personal

1984

income or 9.5% of total state
personal income for the previous
year, whichever is greater. The
number of state employees is limited
to a ratio of state population.

Tennessee

1978

Constitution

Spending

Appropriations limited to the growth
in state personal income.
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

State

Year
Adopted

Texas

1978

Constitution
or Statute
Constitution

Utah

1989

Statute

Type of
Limit
Spending
Spending

Main Features of the Limit
Biennial appropriations limited to the
growth in state personal income.

Spending growth is limited by formula
that includes growth in population, and
inflation.

Washington

1993

Statute

Spending

Spending limited to average of inflation
for previous three years plus population
growth.

Wisconsin

2001

Statute

Spending

Spending limit on qualified
appropriations (some exclusions) limited
to personal income growth rate.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:497

TABLE 4
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
Category

Percentage of Personal
Income
Wis.
Rank
U.S.

2 0 0 4

24'

Per Capita
Wis. $

U.S.($)

Rank

GENERAL REVENUE FROM OWN
SOURCES

15.1%

16.0%

15

4,995

5,136

17

e Taxes

10.4%

11.5%

7

3,447

3,714

13

3.3%

4.2%

8

1,086

1,350

12

" General sales
" Selective sales

2.5%

2.3%

31

836

752

29

" Motor fuel

0.4%

0.5%

12

119

170

6

" Alcoholic beverages

0.1%

0.0%

37

17

9

40

o Property taxes
o Sales and gross receipts

0.1%

0.2%

18

43

56

18

o Individual income

2.2%

3.0%

10

734

954

12

o Corporate income

0.3%

0.4%

13

115

124

12

60

27

" Tobacco products

o Motor vehicle license

0.2%

0.2%

24

64

o Current charges

3.0%

3.0%

28

985

958

33

23.3%

24.0%

22

7,712

7,705

18

o Current operations

17.1%

17.8%

24

5,672

5,730

20

o Capital outlay

EXPENDITURES
* Direct Expenditure

2.8%

2.5%

35

921

789

28

" Education

6.8%

7.6%

13

2,236

2,428

11

" Higher education
" Elementary and
secondary education

1.8%

2.4%

14

591

767

12

4.7%

4.9%

14

1,542

1,585

17

" Public welfare

3.5%

3.9%

17

1,144

1,246

16

" Highways

1.2%

1.6%

19

403

522

17

" Police protection

0.7%

0.8%

11

238

252

12

" Fire protection

0.3%

0.3%

20

97

93

19

" Corrections

0.6%

0.7%

11

193

210

10

o Env't and housing

1.5%

1.6%

19

501

518

19

o Governmental admin.

1.0%

0.9%

37

344

285

39

241. Statistical analysis by the authors based on data from U.S. Census Bureau, supra
note 13, U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances by Level of Government
and by State 2003-04, http://census.gov/govs/estimate/0400ussll.html (last visited Mar. 30
2007), and Bureau of Economic Analysis, supra note 204. Ranking includes Washington,
D.C. (n = 51).
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TABLE 5
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT PATrERNS242

Total
State
Employment Government

Local
Government

Growth in Employment:
Percentage Change 1993-2004
U.S.
Wisconsin
(Wis. Rank)

20.1%
17.2%
28

10.0%
5.4%
36

21.3%
16.0%
36

Percentage of Total Employment 2004
U.S.
Wisconsin
(Wis. Rank)

3.0%
2.9%
37

8.1%
8.0%
26

Percentage Change in Public Share of
Total Employment 1993-2004
U.S.
Wisconsin
(Wis. Rank)

-8.4%
-10.1%
27

1.0%
-1.0%
32

242. Statistical analysis by the authors based on data from Bureau of Economic
Analysis, supranote 204.
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TABLE 6
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCES AND PER CAPITA INCOME: 2004243
Per
Percentage of Personal Income*

Capita*

-0.0404
(0.7784)

0.8818
(0.0001)

Taxes

0.3852
(0.0052)

0.7341
(0.0001)

o Property

0.3852
(0.0052)

0.7341
(0.0001)

-0.2978
(0.0338)

0.3619
(0.0091)

Motor fuel

-0.7367
(0.0001)

-0.1859
(0.1915)

-

Alcoholic beverage

-0.3359
(0.0160)

0.3770
(0.0064)

-

Tobacco products

0.1326
(0.3536)

0.4807
(0.0004)

o Individual income

0.1997
(0.1600)

0.4656
(0.0006)

o Corporate income

0.2769
(0.0491)

-0.0742
(0.6049)

-0.2825

0.3178

o Motor vehicle license

(0.0446)

(0.0231)

-0.6383
(0.0001)
o Current charges
* Marginal difference indicated in parentheses.

-0.3226
(0.0210)

General revenue from own sources

o Sales and gross receipts

I
* General sales
" Selective sales
-

243. Statistical analysis by the authors based on data from U.S. Census Bureau, supra
note 13, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 241, and Bureau of Economic Analysis, supra note
204.
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TABLE 6 (CONTINUED)
Percentage of Personal Income*

Per
Capita*

-0.0895
(0.5325)

0.6147
(0.0001)

" Current operations

-0.1475
(0.3018)

0.4859
(0.0003)

" Capital outlay

0.0629
(0.6610)

0.5141
(0.0001)

" Education

-0.5157
(0.0001)

0.1288
(0.3677)

Expenditure
o Direct expenditure

-

Higher education

-0.6898
(0.0001)

-0.2168
(0.1264)

-

Elementary & secondary
education

-0.1161
(0.4174)

0.2720
(0.0535)

-0.0766
(0.5932)

0.3292
(0.0183)

" Highways

-0.3672
0(0.0080)

-0.1353
(0.3439)

" Police protection

0.3531
(0.0110)

0.6305
(0.0001)

* Fire protection

0.2874
(0.0408)

0.4323
(0.0015)

* Correction

-0.1613
(0.2581)

-0.0731
(0.6102)

o Environment and housing

0,1732
(0.2243)

-0.2406
(0.0890)

o Governmental administration

-0.0539
(0.7073)

0.2769
(0.0492)

* Public welfare

* Marginal difference indicated in parentheses.
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TABLE 7
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH CORRELATIONS2

State Government Job Growth Rate 1993-2004
Local Government Job Growth Rate 1993-2004
State Government Job Share of Total 1993
Local Government Job Share of Total 1993
Change in State Government Share of Total
Employment 1993-2004
Change in Local Government Share of Total
Employment 1993-2004
Marginal difference indicated in parentheses.

Total Job Growth
Rate 1993-2004*
0.5148
(0.0001)
0.8256
(0.0001)
-0.1142
(0.4296)
-0.0696
(0.6309)
-0.4087
(0.0032)
-0.3289
(0.0197)

244. Statistical analysis by the authors based on data from Bureau of Economic
Analysis, supra note 204.
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Table 8

245
MEAN GROWTH IN PER CAPITA INCOME 1987-2004 BY TEL

With
TEL

Without

I

Kruskal-

TEL

F statistic*

Wallis*

Median*

Local
TEL Prior to
1987

4.38

4.45

0.2123
(0.6451)

0.4795
(0.4886)

0.5724
(0.4493)

TEL After 1987

4.24

4.44

0.5035
(0.4782)

0.4804
(0.4882)

0.2555
(0.6133)

4.35

4.48

0.7119
(0.3990)

1.2064
(0.2720)

1.7078
(0.1913)

0.7694
TEL After 1987
4.24
4.44
(0.3806)
* Marginal difference indicated in parentheses.

0.1657
(0.6839)

0.0445
(0.8329)

State
TEL Prior to
1987

245. Statistical analysis by the authors based on data from Bureau of Economic
Analysis, supra note 204, National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 32, and
Mullins & Wallin, supra note 1, at 4-5.

[90:497

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

TABLE 9
8q7 -2OO4246

CTPRWTI4 IN PFR CAPITA INC(OMF MO1-IS., 1

Parks - Autoregressive*
Model A

Model B

Model C

Model D

Model E

Model F

Earnings Per Job

0.00000
(8.25)

0.00000
(8.84)

0.00000
(8.61)

0.00000
(8.18)

0.00000
(8.12)

0.00000
(7.81)

Gross State
Product as a
Percentage of US
GSP

-0.08639
(4.60)

-0.09762
(6.39)

-0.10054
(5.09)

-0.08707
(5.49)

-0.08238
(5.20)

-0.08021
(4.95)

Per Capita Income
Unemployment
Insurance

-0.00006
(3.41)

-0.00005
(3.57)

-0.00005
(3.44)

-0.00005
(3.39)

-0.00006
(3.78)

-0.00006
(3.83)

Per Capita Income
from Retirement
Sources

0.00000
(4.76)

0.00000
(6.13)

0.00000
(5.24)

0.00000
(5.50)

0.00000
(3.88)

0.00000
(3.89)

Ratio of Farm to
Non-farm
Proprietors

0.03334
(6.03)

0.03596
(7.29)

0.03455
(6.42)

0.03603
(6.19)

0.02969
(5.56)

0.03178
(5.19)

Percentage of
Employment in
Manufacturing

0.07292
(5.20)

0.08329
(7.78)

Poverty Rate

0.00109
(9.65)

0.00114
(13.47)

0.08556
(6.72)
0.00114
(10.90)

0.07233
(5.46)
0.00104
(9.16)

0.06715
(5.47)
0.00114
(12.41)

0.06795
(5.00)
0.00107
(9.51)

Local TEL Prior

0.00064

to 1987

-0.00006

(0.55)

Local TEL After
1987

State TEL Prior
to 1987

(0.06)

-0.00373

-0.00352

(2.49)

(2.23)

0.00184

0.00187

(1.67)

(1.70)

State TEL After
1987
*

1

0.00199

0.00267

(1.88)

(2.65)

t- statistic in parentheses.

246. Statistical analysis by the authors based on data from U.S. Census Bureau, supra
note 13, Bureau of Economic Analysis, supra note 204, U.S. Census Bureau, Historical
Poverty Tables, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov21.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2007), National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 32, and Mullins &
Wallin, supra note 1, at 4-5.

